Di cui 240 bln di debito ufficialmente in mano all'UE e IMF
Di cui 130 bln esposizione dell'eurosistema via TARGET 2
Di cui 25bln di perdite per banche private europee (per lo più francesi).
Il vero problema però riguarderebbe un possibile contagio ai depositi bancari di Italia e Spagna.
La continua vendita di bond governativi spagnoli e italiani operata dagli investitori non-europei (200 bln per l'Italia e 80 bln per la Spagna) suggerisce come i mercati vedano la Grecia come la sola punta dell'Iceberg.
Altri asset a richio di essere venduti a breve per Italia e Spagna sono :
800 bln di bond governativi Italiani e Spagnoli ancora nelle mani di investitori stranieri (non Ue)
500 bln di bond di aziende e banche Italiane e Spagnoli in mano ad investitori stranieri (non Ue)
300 bln di azioni di società quotate Italiane e Spagnole detenute da investitori stranieri (non Ue)
Ma, Dulcis in fundo, dovesse questa "catastrofe" srotolarsi, il vero "elefante nella stanza" sarebbe rappresentato dai depositi bancari e dalla conseguente corsa agli sportelli.
per l'Italia si parla di un totale depositi di 1.4 Trilioni di €
per la Spagna si parla di un totale depositi di 1.6 Trilioni di €
 |
| Depositi Bancari per Italia-Spagna-Grecia-Irlanda |
The main direct losses correspond to the €240bn of Greek debt in official hands (EU/IMF), to €130bn of Eurosystem’s exposure to Greece via TARGET2 and a potential loss of around €25bn for European banks. This is the cross-border claims (i.e. not matched by local liabilities) that European banks (mostly French) have on Greece’s public and non-bank private sector. These immediate losses add up to €400bn. This is a big amount but let's assume that, as several people suggested this week, these immediate/direct losses are manageable. What are the indirect consequences of a Greek exit for the rest?
The wildcard is obviously contagion to Spain or Italy? Could a Greek exit create a capital and deposit flight from Spain and Italy which becomes difficult to contain? It is admittedly true that European policymakers have tried over the past year to convince markets that Greece is a special case and its problems are rather unique. We see little evidence that their efforts have paid off.
The steady selling of Spanish and Italian government bonds by non-domestic investors over the past nine months (€200bn for Italy and €80bn for Spain) suggests that markets see Greece more as a precedent for other peripherals rather than a special case. And it is not only the €800bn of Italian and Spanish government bonds still held by non-domestic investors that are likely at risk. It is also the €500bn of Italian and Spanish bank and corporate bonds and the €300bn of quoted Italian and Spanish shares held by nonresidents. And the numbers balloon if one starts looking beyond portfolio/quoted assets. Of course, the €1.4tr of Italian and €1.6tr of Spanish bank domestic deposits is the elephant in the room which a Greek exit and the introduction of capital controls by Greece has the potential to destabilize. In this respect, it is important to keep a close eye on Chart 1.
Source Jp Morgan